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THE LAW OF PUBLIC HOUSING
WILLIAM EBENSTEIN*

I. THE SALIENT FACTS IN THE HousING PROBLEM

action of reformers, pressure of circumstances and
C ONCERTED
farseeing statesmanship have finally succeeded in making this
country "housing-conscious." The biggest housing survey ever
undertaken in history was done by 12,000 CWA workers, and was
finished toward the end of 1934.1 This survey dealt with 64 cities
in 48 states and covered 2,633,135 dwelling units in 1,931,055
buildings. The number of people in these units was 9,074,781.
Cities in excess of 750,000 were not included in the survey. This
is significant, for the results of the Inventory, serious as they are,
would have been still more impressive had the large cities been
covered by the survey as well. But even within the self-chosen
limitations of the survey the data produced give ample evidence of
the major factors and tendencies in the housing situation.
These are some of the more important data emerging from the
Inventory:
17.1 per cent of the dwellings are overcrowded
60 per cent need repairs
49.4 per cent have no furnace or boiler
30.4 per cent have no gag (for cooking)
24.5 per cent have no tubs or showers
17.3 per cent have no private indoor toilet
9.4 per cent have no electricity.
In New York City there are nearly 300,000 rooms with no
windows at all. Addressing the United States Conference of
Mayors at Washington, D. C., on November 19, 1935, United
States Senator Robert F. Wagner said: "In my own city of New
York 510,000 families, or over one-fourth of the total, live in
*1fember, National Association of Housing Officials; Instructor of
Political Science, University of Wisconsin.
'Real Property Inventory, 1934, Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce.
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quarters that a well-trained prison warden would brand as unfit
for his inmates." In New Orleans almost half the homes in two
large blighted areas were provided with no sanitary equipment of
any sort. 2 Similar conditions prevail in other large cities which
were not covered by the Real Property Inventory.
So far no detailed surveys of the Real Property Inventory
have been undertaken for the rural areas. However, from the
data in possession of the Census Bureau and the Department of
Agriculture, the following facts should be noted:
Five out of six homes have no running water; six out of seven
have no electric light; one-half need major repairs; only one out
of twenty comes up to the American standard. 3
The lower-income groups of the American people are the hardest hit by this all-round housing inadequacy. The Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce made a "Financial Survey of
Urban Housing" in 1934, which it published in 1937. This survey covered sixty-one cities, and each state was represented by at
least one city. Only one city investigated had more than 1,000,000
inhabitants, and only five less than 25,000. The inquiry therefore is fairly representative of all sections of the country. According to the popularly held belief 20 to 25 per cent of the family
income is supposed to be spent for rent. In reality less than
thirty per cent of cases reported conformed to this assumed rule,
5 per cent of the families spending less than 20 per cent of their
incomes for rent, and not less than 65 per cent spending more
than 25 per cent of their total incomes for rent. The income
groups of $1-249 spent 112.4 per cent of their income on rent; the
following table gives a picture of the other low income classes :4
Income

Number of Reports

Rent Bill as
per cent of
income

1884
N one ..........................................
112.4
2694
$ 1-249 ....................................
58.9
3569
250-499 -------------------------------38.2
3907
500-749 ....................................
.300
2928
750-999 ...................................
26.0
1000-1499 -----_------------------------ 5049
21.6
3412
1500-1999 ----------------------------19.7
2540
2000-2999 ----------------------------17.3
_--------- 1057
3000-4499 ---..........-------15.0
360
4500-7499 -----------------------------10.9
113
7500 and over .......................
2Homes for Workers, Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works,
Housing Division, Bulletin No. 3, 1937.
3
These data are taken from Homes for Workers, see p. 12 et seq.
4Financial Survey of Urban Housing, p. 279. The data given in the
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These figures show how the housing problem is the problem of
the low income earner. It is also significant that these ratios of
income and rent bill remain pretty much the same in times of
prosperity and depression. The lower income groups of the
American people thus not only live in inadequate housing conditions to a very appreciable degree, but also pay an excessive amount
of their income toward the rent, certainly a larger share than was
assumed before the recent accurately compiled figures were available.
In this country property had customarily been thought of not
so much in terms of earning an income as of reselling it at a
higher price. The rapid rate of growth had led to expectations of
further and further growth until the speculative element in the
value of real property had often overshadowed the economic calculation of actual yield capacity.
This traditionally speculative element in real property came to
a fatal test with the outbreak of the depression after the seven
prosperity years 1922-1929. The value of building permits issued
in 65 representative cities fell from almost 1500 million dollars in
the first half of 1929 to only 160 million dollars in the first half of
1933. In terms of families provided with housing this meant a
drop from 130,000 families to 9,000. The resulting breakdown of
the construction industry accounted for a third of the total unemployment. In 257 representative cities new dwellings erected
averaged 400,000 a year between 1925 and 1929. The number
dropped to 20,848 in 1934. This is less than the number of
houses destroyed by fire each year. 6 The President's message o6n
housing on November 29, 1937, gave the following figures for
the country as a whole: the annual average of new dwelling units
was 800,000 in the seven years prior to 1930, and fell to 180,000
in the seven years 1930-1937. Another vital new element has
entered the picture: while in 1928 77.5 per cent of the country's
building was done by private enterprise, and only 22.5 per cent
table refer to the city of Cleveland. For a more detailed discussion of this
question see Philipson: What Can Families Pay for Housing?, (1936) 1
Insured Mortgage Portfolio 7.
"For a further discussion of this problem see Unwin, Housing and
Planning: English and American Compared, (1937) 85 Journal of the
Royal Society of Arts 718; and Fisher, Impressions of English Housing,
(1936) 1 Insured Mortgage Portfolio 18; Delano, The National Small
Homes Demonstration Program, a radio address reprinted in (1937) Housing Legal Digest No. 37, 33; Our Cities: Their Role in the National
National Resources Committee, June, 1937, pp. 18, 60.
Economy,
8
Winslow, Housing as a Public Health Problem, (1937) 27 Am. Jour.
of Pub. Health 58.
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by public agencies, this ratio changed to 44.5 per cent private and
55.5 per cent public building activity in 1936. This new relationship is not only "due to the large amounts expended for public
works,' 7 but still more so to the inability of private enterprise to
meet the housing needs.

One third of the American people earn

less than $1,200 a year, and another third less than $2,000 a year.
The average cost of a house would require an annual outlay of
over $500 for interest, amortization, taxes and the like, which
amount by far exceeds the financial strength of over two thirds
of the American people.8 This inability of private industry to
meet the nation's housing needs cannot be too strongly emphasized,
for it will be considered again later on in examining the problem
whether public housing represents a public purpose in the meaning
of the law or not.
The costs of under-housing are manifold. Studies in various
countries including the United States, undertaken by private and
official investigators, have clearly brought out the correlation between bad housing and crime. It has not been accurately established
as yet, and perhaps this problem is incapable of being solved, to
what measurable extent bad housing constitutes a direct cause of
crime; it is beyond dispute, however, that there exists a definite
correlation between the two. In the case of juvenile delinquency
even a direct causation can be demonstrated. This in turn reflects
upon the whole problem of crime, since in recent studies it is
shown that the majority of adult criminals begin their delinquent
careers as children. 9
Bad housing as a direct cause of increased morbidity and mortality has been long established as an unchallengeable fact. Professor C. E. A. Winslow of Yale, Chairman of the Committee on
7Facts about Construction and Housing, Chamber of Commerce of the
United
States, Washington, 1937, p. 2.
8
Wood, Housing, 7 Encyc. of the Soc. Sc. 512.
9Probably the best study on this problem is The Relation Between
Housing and Delinquency, which was published as Research Bulletin No. I
by the Housing Division of the Federal Emergency Administration of
Public Works in 1936. See also: The Relation Between Housing and
Delinquency in New Jersey, (1936) Division of Statistics and Research,
New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies; Wood, Slums and
Blighted Areas in the United States, Federal Emergency Administration of
Public Works, (1935) Housing Division Bulletin No. 1; Housing and the
Community-Home Repair and Remodeling, (1932) 8 The President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership; Wood, The Costs of Bad
Housing, (1937) 190 Annals of the Am. Academy of Pol. and Soc. Sc. 145;
Butcher, Community Causes of Crime, (1928) Proceedings American Prison
Association, 25; Burt, The Young Delinquent (1933); Shaw, Delinquency
Areas (1929); Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck, Five Hundred Criminal
Careers (1930).
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the Hygiene of Housing of the American Public Health Association, recently stated that after the struggles for pure milk, control
of tuberculosis, diphtheria immunization, etc., the fight for decent
hygienic housing is the next and most important object of those
concerned with the pressing problems of public health. 10
While the interrelationships of bad housing and crime and
disease supply the main arguments for the attack on defective and
dangerous housing conditions, a new line of approach has recently
been suggested. It is the net cost of the slums in dollars and cents
which is more and more emphasized. The huge relief burden of
the federal government, state and municipal authorities in the last
ten years has focused the attention of many students on the cost
of bad housing to the community at large. Studies of this kind
have been undertaken notably in the cities of Boston, Cleveland,
Indianapolis, Minneapolis and Birmingham. In Indianapolis each
.person in the substandard areas cost the taxpayer $28 as against
$4 per person in other areas. Thirty per cent of the city hospital
service, 26 per cent of the taxes spent for police, fire, health, sanitary services, more than 33 per cent of public relief, and 36 per
cent of the city expenditure for arrests, trials, and imprisonments
went into the substandard areas containing only 10 per cent of the
population. Similar data were found in the other cities where investigations of the same type have recently been undertaken. It
should be pointed out, in addition, that these figures for expenditures refer only to governmental agencies. If the expenditures
made for welfare purposes by private agencies be included, the
financial liabilities of the substandard housing areas to the community appear in a still more unfavorable light."
1uWinslow, Housing as a Public Health Problem, (1937) 27 Am. Jour.
of Pub. Health 61. The same Committee on the Hygiene of Housing has
published Basic Principles of Healthful Housing in (1938) 28 Am. Journ,
,.f Pub. Health. The most important recent official studies are by two
memhers of the United States Public Health Service: Britten, The Relation
between Housing and Health, (1934) 49 Public Health Reports 1301, and
Dallavalle, Some Factors Which Affect the Relationship between Housing
and Health, (1937) 52 Public Health Reports 989; the results of a comprehensiv e survey in Detroit in 1928 were published in Congestion and its
Relation to Important Social and Health Problems, (1929) 13 City Health
Bulktin Nos. 7 and 8, Detroit Department of Health.
"Woodbury, Costs of Slums and Blighted Areas, Bulletin No. 99,
National Akssociation of Housing Officials. Mr. Milton Lowenthal, speaking
for the Housing Study Guild on the relationship between relief money and
slums, made the following statement: "We find that $180 per year (relief
rent per family) is paid for slum housing, so that although we do not call
it a subsidy, we have one government agency financing slums and others
(Senate Hearing, June 4-7,
supposedly maintained to eliminate them."
1,35, S. 2392). For a further discussion of the economic costs of sub-standard housing see also the following: Urban Housing, Federal Emergency
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The magnitude of the housing problem can also be measured
from the discrepancy between what has been achieved and what
is needed. In the last seven years an annual average of only
180,000 new dwelling units has been constructed as against 800,000
in the years prior to 1930, this in face of a constantly growing
potulation. Yet these are the figures on the estimated numbers
of needed new dwellings in the next ten years: President Roosevelt
gave the figure of 600,000 to 800,000 per annum

;12 Mr.

Henry

Harriman, President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, gave the figure of 750,000 per annum for working men
alone ;13 Mr. Nathan Straus, United States Housing Administrator,
stated the number at 900,000 per annum ;1 Senator Wagner, who
has given as much study and reflection to the housing problem as
anyone in Congress, declared that in the next ten years fourteen
million new homes will be needed to provide adequately for normal
population increases, for obsolescence, and for the demolition or
abandonment of millions of dwellings totally unfit for human
habitation. 5
The depth of the depression had to be reached for large-scale
government building of homes to come into its own. The Housing
Division of the Public Works Administration established under
the National Industrial Recovery Act in 193316 was authorized to
engage in construction, reconstruction, alteration, or repair under
public regulation or control of low-cost housing and slum-clearance
projects. The primary purpose in the creation of the Public Works
Administration as well as of the Housing Division was to "increase employment quickly.' 7 Long-term planning thus, at times,
had to-be sacrificed to exigencies of extreme emergency. But it
was a beginning on a large scale, larger than ever before undertaken by any governmental agency in the United States.
The Division started out in 1933 with a policy of lending primarily financial assistance to new housing constructions. Qualified
Administration of Public Works, Bulletin No. 2 (1936) 8; Wood, The Costs
of Bad Housing, (1937) 190 Annals of the Am. Academy of Pol. and Soc.
Sc. 147; Navin, An Analysis of a Slum Area in Cleveland, (1934) Cleveland
Metropolitan Housing Authority; Income and Cost Study of the City of
Boston, (1935) Boston City Planning Board.
12In his message on Housing of November 29, 1937.
'Isn his address of November 1, 1934, on Unemployment Relief and
Housing.
14New York Times, October 25, 1937.
15In his address to the United States Conference of Mayors, at
Washington, D. C., on November 19, 1935.
iGAct of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. at L. 95, 40 U. S. C. A. (Supp.)
ch. 8.
17Section 203a of the NIRA.
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applicants for loans were to receive a loan of 85 per cent of the
cost of the project. The applicants themselves had to supply the
remainder 15 per cent in true equity. The loans were to yield
4 per cent interest, and were to be paid off within 30 years. The
Housing Division received 500 applications by the end of 1933.
Only seven projects of limited-dividend housing corporations were
approved. All other applications had to be refused, either because
the prescribed equity was not available, or because some applicants
requested loans for such projects as hotels, stores, theaters, and
tourist camps, including a twelve-story hotel in the desert of Arizona. In February, 1934, the Housing Division abandoned the
limited-dividend loan policy, and started with the construction of
low-rent housing and slum-clearance under its own responsibility.
Fifty-one projects in thirty-six cities providing for about 22,000
famililes were the result. The Division of Housing was allotted
some 150 million dollars for the purpose. 45 per cent of the entire cost is borne by the United States; 55 per cent of the development cost is amortized over a period of sixty years, the interest
being 3 per cent.
The room rentals in these projects range from $7 a month in
New York downward to much lower figures in smaller communities, especially in the South. This compares favorably with
the room rentals of $10 to $13 in the limited dividend corporation
projects.
The Housing Division of the Public Works Administration
was taken over by the United States Housing Authority on November 1, 1937; its record has been much criticized on the grounds
of excessive costs, of excessive centralization, of indifference to
the wishes of local authorities, and of unfair and ruinous competition with private enterprise.
An important feature in the four years' life history of the
Housing Division of the Public Works Administration was its
standardizing influence on the housing legislation of the states.
Already in 1933 and 1934 ten states had passed enabling acts for
public housing authorities, foremost among them" the Municipal
Housing Authorities Law of the State of New York.18 In 1935
18
New York Laws of 1934, ch. 4. Harold L. Ickes, Public Works
Administrator, sent Mayor La Guardia the following telegram on January
3, 1934: "The Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation has earmarked an amount not to exceed twenty-five million dollars available for

loan to duly constituted New York City Housing Authority subject to
submission satisfactory low cost housing project which meets our approval." On January 31, 1934, the state legislature passed the bill, and
on February 6, 1934, the New York City Housing Authority was estab-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

the Legal Division of the Public Works Administration drafted
model bills for both state and supplementary municipal legislation.
Today thirty states, 19 the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Puerto
Rico have housing authority laws. Under these enabling laws
one hundred three local housing authorities had been created by
February, 1938, and their number is constantly increasing due to
the complete decentralization under the new United States Housing Authority. All these states except one have granted the right
of eminent domain to housing authorities, 20 but a number of states
do not exempt the property of the housing authorities from taxation. 2 1 The United States Housing Act of 1937 provides that the
United States Housing Authority will make no annual contributions to public housing agencies to assist in achieving and maintaining the low-rent character of their housing projects "unless
and until- the State, city, county, or other political subdivision in
which such project is situated shall contribute, in the form of cash
or tax remissions, general or special, or tax exemptions, at least
20 per centum of the annual contributions herein provided. ' ' 22

In

states, therefore, where tax exemption is not provided for by the
law, this 20 per cent will have to be raised by loan or otherwise,
which will no doubt prove a stumbling block to the realization of
the projects in many cases.
Federal participation in housing has finally found a more
comprehensive organization in the "United States Housing Act
of 1937," popularly known as the Wagner-Steagall Act.2 3 Whether

or not it is the "greatest single step forward in national housing
lished. Mr. Nathan Straus, present United States Housing Administrator,
was at
one time the city's special Commissioner on Housing.
' 9 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin. For sources of
authority see (1938) Housing Legal Digest, No. 43, 34, and State Housing
Authority Legislation, A Comparative Study of State Enabling Laws, published by the National Association of Housing Officials, with Addenda thereto as20of December 1, 1937.
Rhode Island authorizes the cities to condemn for the housing
authorities.
2
lDelaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey. In the case of Illinois
the statute is silent on the point, but Mr. Otto Kerner, Attorney General of
Illinois, has rendered his opinion on January 17, 1936, stating that "property
held by Housing Authorities under the Act of March 19, 1934, is held as
private property and is taxable in full." In the case of Ohio the law is
silent, too, but the Attorney General of the State, Mr. John W. Bricker,
has given an opinion on September 29, 1934, declaring property of
housing
22 authorities to be tax exempt.
Public. No. 412, 75th Congress, Ch. 10 (a).
23
Public. No. 412, 75th Congress. Passed on Septerber 1, 1937.
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ptolicy ever taken by any country," 24 it is certainly the greatest
step forward in housing policy in the history of the United States.
Under the regime of the Housing Division of the Public Works
Administration the main objective of governmental intervention
was creation of employment and purchasing power, and the housing projects had the avowed aim of serving as a demonstration
of public activity breaking into a new field. Under the Act of
1937, housing has assumed a status of autonomy in the range of
federal and state activities.
The main objective of the United States Housing Authority is
to give federal financial aid to state and local housing authorities
to provide decent, sanitary, and safe dwellings for families of low
income. The latter term means, according to section 2 (2) of the
Act, "families who are in the lowest income group and who cannot afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise in their
locality or metropolitan area to build an adequate supply of decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use." This is important as a final governmental admission that housing for large
sections of the population has moved into the type of goods for
which mere economic market calculations have to be, abandoned
in favor of a policy of social welfare.
Only those families are eligible whose income is less than
five times the rental, including the cost of heat, light, water, and
cooking fuel. This is to prevent persons from higher income
brackets from taking advantage of the low-rent housing intended
for persons who cannot afford decent dwellings in the private
market.
The United States Housing Authority will undertake only
financial transactions of the types described, and will not engage
in any demonstration projects or make loans to limited-dividend
or cooperative housing associations, as did the Housing Division
of the Public Works Administration. The federal government no
longer engages in construction of dwellings itself, not only because it has been declared unconstitutional as not constituting a
federal public purpose,25 but because the time has come for de24
Mr. Nathan Straus, United States Housing Administrator, at the
annual meeting of the National Association of Housing Officials in Cleveland,25November 18-20, 1937.
Condemnation proceedings on Public Works Administration projects
were declared unconstitutional in United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, (W.D. Ky. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 137, aff'd in (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1935) 78
F. (2d) 684, dismissed on motion of Solicitor General, (1936) 294 U. S.
735, 55 Sup. Ct. 548, 79 L. Ed. 1263, and in United States v. Certain Lands
in Detroit, (E.D. Mich. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 345; the exercise of eminent
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centralizing housing and placing responsibility and authority on
the local agencies. Mr. Nathan Straus has rightly characterized
the Act as "essentially a piece of enabling legislation, 2 since it
formulates the national housing policy in broad outlines, and
leaves the actual work of planning and developing the projects as
well as authority and responsibility to the local housing body.
The projects which the Authority took over from the Housing
Division of the Public Works Administration are gradually turned
over to the local housing agencies; section 12 (b) of the Act requires the Authority to divest itself of those Federal projects "as
soon as practicable." This is another step to insure that the
Authority be a financing agency, and leave the responsibility for
operating slum-clearance and low-rent projects to local agencies.
Another provision of the Act aiming at the decentralization of
housing in the country is section 21 (d) of the Act which establishes that not more than 10 per cent of the Authority's funds for
loans, capital grants or annual contributions shall be expended in
any one state.
The importance of the United States Housing Act of 1937
lies in the fact that it has made federal and state participation in
solving the housing problem a permanent governmental activity;
has abandoned calculations of a market economy in the specific
problems of slum-clearance and low-rent housing, which now have
become areas of public purpose and public use; and has raised
the housing issue above the contentiousness of partisan opinion,
27
turning it into a lasting national concern of the American people.

II.

PUBLIC HoUsING AND THE LAw: FEDERAL

The housing program of the Public Works Administration began in February 1934, and in July of the same year a Federal
District Court in Cleveland had to decide whether the United
States could condemn land for a low-cost housing project. 2 The
domain on behalf of a Resettlement Administration project was held un-

constitutional in Franklin Township v. Tugwell, (1936) 66 D. C. App.
42, 85 F. (2d) 208. The only decision where slum-clearance and low-cost
housing had been held a federal public use authorizing the exercise of
eminent domain is Oklahoma City v. Sanders, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1938)
94 F.. (2d) 323. The Supreme Court has not decided as yet upon this
question.
2
61n his address to the annual meeting of the National Association of
Housing Officials at Cleveland, November 18-20, 1937.
27"If, indeed, the deeper purpose of democratic government is to
assist as many of its citizens as possible, especially those who need it the
most, then we have a great opportunity lying ahead in the specific field of
housing."
President Roosevelt, (1937) Housing Index-Digest No. 13, 52.
28
United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Cleveland, District
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Cleveland project included the acquisition by the United States
Government of all the property bounded by Cedar and Central
Avenues. About 88 per cent of the land needed for this so-called
Cedar-Central project had been secured by voluntary agreement,
but in some of the remaining parcels of land no agreement could
be reached, so that condemnation proceedings under section 203a
of the National Industrial Recovery Act and Executive Order
No. 6252 were instituted.
The Court decided in favor of the United States. The main
contention of the motion of the property owners, viz., that the
United States was not the proper and legal party to the suit, sidetracked the real issue whether housing was a federal public purpose for which eminent domain could be exercised. Nevertheless
the Court pointed out in the opinion that even if that question were
made and presented here, it would not have been entirely satisfied
that the law was unconstitutional, and would therefore have ruled
that it was not.
Another case in which the exercise of eminent domain by the
Federal Government was disputed was In the Matter of CondemThe District of
nation of Part of Lot 29 in Square 926.
Columbia Dwelling Act3" provided for the discontinuance of the
use as dwellings of buildings situated in alleys, to eliminate the
hidden communities in inhabited alleys of the District of Columbia in the interest of public health, comfort, morals, safety and
welfare. The exercise of eminent domain was expressly granted
to the Alley Dwelling Authority.
The Court rendered an oral opinion overruling the demurrer
of the property owners, holding that Congress in the exercise of
its exclusive legislative authority over the District of Columbia
could authorize the employment of such means and methods as
are necessary to protect the health, comfort, morals, safety and
welfare of the citizens of the District of Columbia, and that the
employment of the power of eminent domain to'remedy conditions
which notoriously undermine and endanger the health, comfort,
morals, safety and welfare of the citizens of the District of Columbia was clearly within the scope of the constitution. The Court
further held that having once acquired the property, the governCourt of the United States, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division,
No. 218,076, Oral Opinion of Court, July 25, 1934.
. AUnited States district court for the District of Columbia, No. 2464;
the decision was rendered on May 18, 1937.
30Approved June 12, 1934, ch. 465 (48 Stat. at L. 930).
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ment was authorized under the constitution to dispose of it in the
manner indicated by the Act.
Important as this case is, it is necessary to emphasize two
points: first, that it did not pass at all on the question of housing
as a federal public purpose, since it was confined to the District
of Columbia, in which Congress legislates in the same way as
states do in their territories. The case therefore, although dealing with activities of the federal government, really bears on the
constitutionality of the exercise of eminent domain for housing
by the states. The second significant characteristic of this case
is that the primary issue which it decided was slum-clearance as
a public purpose, and not the provision of low-rent housing. The
problems are in practice closely related to each other, but are not
the same.
The first and still the only leading case in which the question
of low-rent housing and slum clearance as federal public uses was
the central issue, was United States v. Certain Lands in the City
of Louisville,3' decided by Judge Dawson of the United States
district court for the western district of Kentucky on January 4.
1935. The United States circuit court of appeals for the Sixth
circuit upheld the decision of the lower court on July 15, 1935.
The case was to be tried before the Supreme Court on March 5,
1936, but was withdrawn by the attorneys for the government a
few hours before oral arguments were to be made before the
Court.
The court emphasized in the opinion that it was well aware of
the significance of the case at bar, since it presented for the first
time the sole question of the constitutional power of the United
States to acquire, through condemnation, property of citizens for
the purpose of slum-clearance and low-cost housing. Private
property can be condemned only for public use, as is stated expressly in the fifth amendment and may be inferred from the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. But what is public
use as relating to the question'of eminent domain? In the opinion
of the court, there are two schools of thought:
"One, holding that public use is synonymous with public
benefit, public advantage and general welfare, while the other
holds that public use means use by the government itself in the
performance of governmental functions, or a use or service open
or available to all or a part of the public as of right, irrespective
3'(W.D. Ky. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 137, aff'd in (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1935)
78 F. (2d) 684, dismissed on motion of Solicitor General, (1936) 294
U. S. 735, 55 Sup. Ct. 548, 79 L. Ed. 1263.
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of whether the title to the property condemned is vested in the
government or in some private agency. It seems to-me that the
first theory is an entirely untenable one."
This is the vision of the grave consequences which in the mind
of the court governmental housing might entail:
"If such an activity is a governmental function, then the government is likewise possessed of the power to acquire by condemnation farm lands, improve them, and then sell or lease them to
citizens. Such a power would likewise include the right to acquire by condemnation mills, factories, mines and every conceivable kind of industrial plant, for the purpose of operating them in
competition with private industry, or for the purpose of selling
or leasing them to whomsoever the government might wish."
The very lengthy argument in the government brief concerning
the emergency character of the National Industrial Recovery Act
and the works authorized under it, scarcely finds any discussion
in the opinion of the court. The court admits that an emergency
existed at the time of the enactment of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, and had not yet passed at the time,
"but the power of the National Government to exercise the
right of eminent domain can not be based upon the existence of a
national emergency. The power, if it can be exercised for the purposes for which it is here sought to be used, must exist independently of such emergency. The emergency at most can only afford a reason for its exercise."
The court cites in support of this view Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdcll," which used similar words but interpreted
them in a broader, more liberal way. The court did not go at all
into the factual background of the Act, as the Supreme Court did
in the case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,
and although admitting the existence of a state of emergency, did
not inquire whether the public works inaugurated under the
National Industrial Recovery, Act were "necessary and proper"
toward this aim. What the government claimed was not that it
had a general right of exercising eminent domain on the ground
of national emergency, but that the particular emergency legislation was constitutional, so that eminent domain as an inherent
power of government could be used for it. The court did not go
into this question, but disposed of the emergency issue in an abstract way by arguing a general proposition that eminent domain
crnnot he based on emergency.
As to the claim of the government that its action was consti•u-(1934) 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231. 78 L. Ed. 413, 88 A. L. R.
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tutional under the "general welfare" clause of the constitution, the
Court emphasized that the interpretation of this clause was still
"an open question." 3 However, it was ready to concede that
congressional appropriations under this provision of the constitution are not necessarily limited to those matters expressly under the
control of Congress.
The United States appealed; the case was tried before the
United States circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit, and
the decision of the lower court upheld on July 15, 1935.3' The
central issue was again considered to be the alleged power of the
federal government to exercise the power of eminent domain for
purposes of slum-clearance and low-cost housing.
The lower court had made no distinction, in the discussion of
housing as a public use, between the power of eminent domain
as applied to the federal government and as referring to the states.
The circuit court pointed out that most of the cases cited in support of housing as a public use were instituted under state statutes,
and therefore did not apply to the federal government. What
might be a public use under one sovereign might not be a public
use under another. The state and federal governments are distinct
sovereignties, each independent of the other and each restricted to
its own sphere. In the exercise of its police power a state may
do these things which benefit the health, morals and welfare of its
people. The federal government, however, had no such powers
within the states. The Court thus did not deny the character of
slum-clearance and low-cost housing as a public use in all instances,
but introduced the significant distinction between the constitutional
implications of federal and state housing. It may have been motivated to this line of reasoning by the fact that on April 12, 1935,
i.e., shortly after the decision of the lower court in United States
v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, a supreme court of New
York had handed down its decision in New York City Housing
Authority v. Muller 5 upholding for the first time slum-clearance
and low-cost housing as public uses for which a state or an
authority created by it could exercise the power of eminent domain.
The Court did not deny that the housing scheme would increase
employment, and benefit many residents of the community, and
that these group benefits, so far as they might affect the general
3
sIt should be pointed out again that the first judicial interpretation of
the clause was given only in the following year in the Butler Case.
34(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 684.
35(1935) 155 Misc. Rep. 681, 279 N. Y. S. 299.
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public, would be beneficial. However, the vision of slum-clearance
as a direct step to state Communism plays a decisive part in shaping the attitude of the circuit court of appeals, just as it did in the
lower court:
"If, however, such a result thus attained is to be considered a
public use for which the government may condemn private property, there would seem to be no reason why it could not condemn
any private property which it could employ to an advantage to the
public. There are perhaps many properties that the government
could use for the benefit of selected groups. It might be, indeed,
that by acquiring large sections of the farming parts of the country and leasing the land or selling it at low prices it could advance
the interests of many citizens of the country, or that it could take
over factories and other businesses and operate them upon plans
more beneficial to the employees or the public, or even operate or
sell them at a profit to the government to the relief of the taxpayers."
The ruling of United States v. Certain Lands in the City of
Louisville was adopted on October 23, 1935, by the United States
district court of the eastern district of Michigan in United States
v. Certain Lands in the City of Detroit,3 6 In this case, too, the
United States, acting through the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works, attempted to exercise the power of eminent
domain for a low-cost housing and slum-clearance project under
the public works provisions of the National Industrial Recovery
Act.
The United States appealed against the decision in the Louisville Case as handed down by the circuit court of appeals, and the
case was assigned to be argued before the Supreme Court on
March 5, 1936. Only a few hours before oral arguments were to
be made in the Louisville Case before the Supreme Court, attorneys for the United States asked the Supreme Court to dismiss the
37
case.
The department of justice immediately issued a statement that
in forty-one of the slum-clearance projects the necessary land
was secured by negotiation. In eight others the land was secured
in part by condemnation, no question being raised except the
amount of the compensation. The Louisville project and the addition to the Detroit project, which had been determined more
than a year ago, had been the subject of continuous legal controversy. In view of the long period of delay, caused by the court
proceedings, the funds originally allocated had been diverted to
311(E.D. Mich. 1935) 12 F. Sup. 345.
37(1936) 294 U. S. 735, 55 Sup. Ct. 548, 79 L. Ed. 1263.
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other projects which were not involved in litigation and where it
was possible to go forward with the work promptly. Even if the
case had been considered by the Court, and the theory of the
government sustained, it would not have been possible to proceed
with either of the undertakings. It was concluded, therefore,
that it was not proper to submit to the Court for decision cases
which, as a practical matter, had become moot.
In addition to the reasons officially indicated by the statement
of the department of justice, the main reason was the following:
United States v. Butler, which tended to establish the spending
power of Congress as a separate, substantive power, was decided
on January 6, 1936, about two months before the Louisville Case
was to be argued before the Supreme Court. While the government had based its argument before the district court and the circuit court of appeals primarily on the public use question and the
ensuing power of condemnation, the brief presented to the Supreme
Court sought to sustain the exercise of the power of eminent
domain on the ground that the condemnatior is an incident of the
spending power of Congress. The brief expressly quoted the Butler Case, for the first time since it was announced, in order to support this argument. However, there were other departments in
Washington which were vitally interested in cases to be decided by
the Supreme Court in which the interpretation of the "general welfare" clause was involved. They felt strongly that the Louisville
Case, because of the additional and doubtful issue of condemnation, was not a particularly suitable one to be heard first. They
therefore prevailed upon the department of justice, and through
it probably upon the President, to have the appeal dismissed so
that the other cases could be decided first. This referred especially
to two cases in which the right of the federal government to lend
funds and make grants to local government agencies for the production and the distribution of electricity was the issue. In both
cases, which were decided by the Supreme Court on January 3,
1938, the right of the government was upheld by a unanimous
Court. 38 These favorable decisions will be important as a precedent if and when the United States Housing Act of 1937, which
provides for federal expenditures on local government housing
projects, will be tested-in court.
The most recent case in which the issue was decided whether
38

Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, (1938) 302 U. S. 464, 58 Sup. Ct. 302,
82 L. Ed. 263, and Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood Count,, (1938) 302
U. S. 485, 58 Sup. Ct. 306, 82 L. Ed. 270.
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slum-clearance and low-cost housing are federal public uses, was
3
The case arose from an action
Oklahoma City v. Sanders.
brought by a contractor engaged in the construction of a federal
low-cost housing project to restrain a city and certain of its officers from enforcing certain municipal ordinances in connection
with that construction. According to section 10053 of Oklahoma
Statutes 1931, 80 Okla. Stat. Ann., ch. 1, the state of Oklahoma
gives its consent to the acquisition by the United States, by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, of any land in the State required for sites "for needful public buildings or for any other
purposes for the government." By section 10054 exclusive jurisdiction over lands so acquired by the United States is ceded to the
United States for all purposes except the service upon such sites
of all civil and criminal process of the courts of the State.
The Court refused to adopt the ruling of the Louisville Case,
and upheld federal slum-clearance and low-cost housing as federal
public uses:
"The Congress of the United States has declared such a lowcost housing and slum-clearance project to be a public use, authorizing the acquisition of lands for such purpose, either by purchase or the exercise of the power of eminent domain."
Under the United States Housing Act of 1937, federal housing
activities are now restricted to financial operations, so that the
main legal issue that may still be determined in court is the constitutionality of employing the spending power of Congress for
housing. But who could contest the constitutionality? Under
Massachusetts v. Mellon 40 neither a state nor an individual is
recognized to have a sufficient interest to contest the spending
power of Congress. The first major inroad made into this doctrine was United States v. Butler, which admitted an exception
from the general doctrine of Massachusetts v. Mellon in those instances where a specific excise or tax is challenged, the proceeds of
which would be used for an illegal purpose. Since the federal
government, under the United States Housing Act of 1937, levies
no specific taxes or excises to finance its housing program therefor which the rule of
under, only the spending power is involved,
41
Massachusetts v. Mellon still stands.
3

9(C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 323.
262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078.
40(1923)
41
In Franklin Township v. Tug-well, (1936) 66 App. D. C. 42, 85 F.
(2d) 208, popularly known as the Bound-Brook Case, the Resettlement
Administration was enjoined from acquiring land in the township of Franklin
in New Jersey for the purpose of erecting there a "model community" to be
inhabited by resettled urban workers. Both the township and indi-
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But even if a court will be found to deal with a case in which
the constitutionality of federal spending on housing will be the
main issue, the chances are that it will be upheld. This opinion
is based on a scrutiny of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
last two years.
One issue is no longer open to dispute now: Congress may
spend money in aid of the "general welfare." United States v.
Butler, decided in 1936, seems for the first time expressly to have
adopted the Hamiltonian view that the power of Congress "to
provide for the general welfare" is an independent and substantive
power in addition to those enumerated elsewhere. And in Helvering v. Davis,42 a case dealing with the constitutionality of the
Social Security Act, Mr. justice Cardozo, handing down the
majority opinion said: "Congress may spend money in aid of the
'general welfare.' There have been great statesmen in our history
vidual taxpayers were admitted to have standing in court. Since the
population of the township would be increased from 6,500 to about 9,500,
the primary interest involved was, in the opinion of the court, governmental
rather than a mere matter of taxation, inasmuch as the township's corporate functions would be impaired by the separation and the reduction of
the property left to it. As to the individual taxpayers, the Court held that
they, too, had a justiciable interest in the case. While citing approvingly
Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Court felt that the facts in the present case
distinguished it from Massachusetts v. Mellon, since in that case "the
individual was a taxpayer in the same position as millions of other citizens
paying federal taxes. In the case at bar the plaintiffs are taxpayers in a
municipality having a population of only 6,500, the chief portion of the
revenues of which is derived from taxes on real estate." Another case
against a model community of the Resettlement Administration was instituted
in the Greendale project near Milwaukee, but the case was dropped by the
plaintiffs, mostly building associations, before it was to be argued in court.
The main argument of plaintiffs was that Milwaukee would lose tax
revenues owing to the tax exemption of federal property, and that the
construction of new dwellings for the low-income families would cause
over 500 vacancies in their buildings which would substantially impair their
properties in rentals and sales value; and that this taking of property was
without due process of law. It should not be forgotten that the main issue
in the Bound-Brook Case arose from the fact that a federal agency not only
financed but also owned and operated the project, which made the property
tax-exempt, and in addition imposed new burdens on the existing communities. In the Bound-Brook Case the government made agreements with
the local taxing authorities by which they would receive from the United
States amounts equivalent to the taxes normally levied on the project property. But these problems will not come up again, since the Resettlement
Administration has been taken over by the Farm Security Administration,
and the same policy will be pursued as in the case of the housing activities
of the Public Works Administration. The Bound-Brook Case remains
important only for its interpretation of the Massachusetts v. Mellon doctrine. It is a rather unreliable principle to distinguish the two cases on
the basis of arithmetic, since the question will have to be settled how large
a municipality must be, so that the interest of the taxpayer becomes "comparatively minute and indeterminable," as Massachusetts v. Mellon says.
42(1937) 301 ,U.S. 619, 57 Sup. Ct. 904, 81 L. Ed. 1307, 109 A. L. R.
1319.
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who have stood for other views. We will not resurrect the contest. It is now settled by decision."
However, United States v. Butler has not only settled an old
issue, but created new ones. In determining whether the federal
government under its spending power could appropriate money
for the farmers upon condition that they restrict production, the
Court did not go into the question of whether these appropriations were for the general welfare, and thus the exercise of an
independent, substantive power. Instead the Court based its
reasoning on the consideration that agriculture is a matter reserved
to the states by the tenth amendment.
The Social Security Act cases, decided in 1937, brought some
clarifications on the points which the Butler Case had left obscure.
First of all, the Supreme Court did not start out with an a priori
assertion that unemployment relief or old age benefits are subjects
reserved to the states. Instead it considered all the factual studies
on these issues undertaken by private and official research bodies.
From these it unmistakably emerged that these problems were
definitely national in character. It recognized the difficulties of
satisfactorily defining the extent of the spending power, and said:
"The line must still be drawn between one welfare and another,
between particular and general. Where this shall be placed cannot be placed through a formula in advance of the event. There is
a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at
large. The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The
discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong,
a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. This
is now familiar law.""
As to the argument that the Social Security Act was coercing
the States and invading their reserved rights in contravention of
the Tenth Amendment, the Court, through Mr. Justice Cardozo,
pointed out that the states bad passed these laws under no duress,
and had realized the advantages of a nationally co-ordinated system of administering the provisions contained in the Social Security
Act.
It is submitted that the United States Housing Act of 1937
would be held constitutional even within the limitations of the
Butler Case, and certainly if the rulings in the Social Security Act
Cases should be adopted in place of the Butler Case. The Social
Security Act was upheld as constitutional because it differed from
the Butler Case in four vital points, upon which the latter was in4
OHelvering v. Davis, (1937)
A. L. R. 1319.

301 U. S. 619, 57 Sup. Ct. 904, 109
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validated: (1) The proceeds of the tax in controversy were not
earmarked for a special group; (2) The unemployment compensation law which is a condition of the credit had the approval of the
state and could not be a law without it; (3) The condition was
not linked to an irrevocable agreement, for the state at its pleasure
may repeal its unemployment law, terminate the credit, and place
itself where it was before the credit was accepted; (4) The condition was not directed to the attainment of an unlawful end, but to
an end, the relief of unemployment, for which nation and state
may lawfully co-operate.

44

In contrast to the Butler and the Social Security Cases the constitutionality of housing would not present the first problem at all,
since the federal government does not levy any specific excise
the proceeds of which are used for its financial activities in the
housing field. While in the Agricultural Adjustment Act (declared unconstitutional in the Butler Case) the transactions of
appropriations and control were carried on directly between individual farmers and the federal government, the Social Security
Act provides for State Boards established under state laws which
deal with the federal government. The same also applied to the
slum-clearance and low-cost housing activities of the states under
the United States Housing Act of 1937.
We also do not think that a court would adopt for the matter of
slum-clearance and low-cost housing the warning of the Butler
Case that a "wide-spread similarity of local conditions" does not
create a "situation of national concern." In the Social Security
Cases the questions of the national aspects of unemployment and
old age disabilities were thoroughly examined in the light of the
available data, amd found to be covered by the "general welfare"
clause of the constitution. There is no doubt that if in a federal
housing case the Court will adopt the factual approach of Mr.
Justice Cardozo and Mr. Justice Stone in the Social Security
Cases, the national character of the housing problem not only in
its geographical distribution, but also in its causes, effects and
remedies will be recognized. In the Louisville Case both the
district court and the circuit court of appeals persisted in
viewing slum-clearance and low-cost housing activities as isolated
relations between the government and individual citizens. That
pattern of thinking would hardly be adopted by the Supreme Court
4Steward v. Davis, (1937) 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. Ed.
1279, 109 A. L. R. 1293.
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after the Social Security Cases. As was said in Greenwood County
z. Duke Power Co. :4
"No matter how clearly national the end to be attained by
expenditures under the general welfare clause, or how appropriate
the means adopted for the attainment of that end, each individual
expenditure must needs have a local as well as a national character."
No a priori legal reasoning can decide in advance whether and
when agriculture, unemployment or housing become national concerns relating to the "general welfare" clause of the constitution. The decision that the federal government may finance and
co-ordinate certain essential programs relating to unemployment
and old age at a certain time like ours, does not necessarily imply
that these subjects have been made federal spheres of action in all
aspects and at all times. As was aptly said in Helvering v. Davis:
"Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were
narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day
with the well being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the times." There is nothing a priori federal or nonfederal about any newly emerging subject. The urgency and
seriousness may change according to the conditions of the time
which have to be investigated in each instance, and if this factual
and pragmatic approach will be employed in adjudicating the
housing problem of our time, there is hardly any doubt that the
housing problem will be found to be national in character.
The most recent cases which would point to the constitutionality
of the Wagner-Steagall Act are two cases upholding the right
of the federal government to lend funds and make grants to local
agencies for the production and distribution of electricity." These
cases involved "loan-and-grant agreements" made by the Federal
Emergency Administration of Public Works with four municipalities in Alabama.
The court held that these municipalities have the right under
state law to engage in business in competition with the company,
and if the business of the latter "be curtailed or destroyed by the
operations of the municipalities, it will be by lawful competition
from which no legal wrong results." These federal loans and
grants to municipalities for the production and distribution of
4'5(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 986.
"4Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, (1938) 302 U. S. 464, 58 Sup. Ct. 302,
82 L. Ed. 263. and Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, (1938) 302
U. S. 485, 58 Sup. Ct. 306. 82 L. Ed. 270. Both decisions were unanimous
and were handed down on January 3, 1938.
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electricity are very similar to the loans and grants made by the
United States Housing Authority to local government agencies
for slum-clearance and low-cost housing projects. -In both cases
there is no specific excise tax to lend itself as a basis for an action,
as in the AAA and Social Security issues. These power cases
are again strengthening the essential doctrine of Massachusetts v.
Mellon, after the inroads made on it in the Ashwander (TVA),
AAA, and Bound-Brook Cases.
Still more important than the question of justiciability is the
recognitijn that municipalities have the right to use federal funds
to compete with private companies, even if that action would injure
or even ruin the business of the latter. In the Loumville Case
both the district court and the circuit court of appeals had pictured
a vision of federal 'participation in slum-clearance and low-cost
housing as a logical step to state communism. Both courts did not
inquire either whether or when private industry had failed to
meet the housing needs of large sections of the American people,
nor what legal right the building industry could claim to carry on
the construction of houses as an exclusive monopoly. The answer
to the anxiety of the two courts dealing with the Louisville Case
lest federal housing may lead to socializing the whole economy is
given in a clear way by the PWA Power Cases, as it was already
intimated by the late Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v.
Haskell:47
"It is asked whether the State could require all corporations or
all grocers to help to guarantee each other's solvency, and where
we are going to draw the line. But the last is a futile question,
and we will answer the others when they arise."4
47(1910) 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 299, 55 L. Ed. 112. The case dealt

with the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute of December 17, 1907,
subjecting
state banks to assessments for a Depositors' Guaranty Fund.
4
8The question has been discussed repeatedly whether the federal government has the power of eminent domain in its housing projects. This
question is now of purely theoretical interest, since under the WagnerSteagall Act the United States has no authority to undertake housing projects of its own for which the exercise of eminent domain might be necessary. For literature bearing on this problem, cf. Corwin, Constitutional
Aspects of Federal Housing, (1935) 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 131; Woodbury, Land
Assembly for Housing Developments, (1934) 1 Law and Cont. Prob. 213;
Seaks, A Note on the Power of the Federal Government to Condemn for
Housing, (1934) 1 Law and Cont. Prob. 232; Robbins, The -Use of Eminent
Domain for Housing Purposes, Housing Officials' Yearbook, 1936, p. 116;
Comment (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rev. 512; Samuel, State and Federal Power of
Eminent Domain (1935) 4 George Wash. L. Rev. 130. The federal government has won eminent domain cases involving the taking of property for
bridges, Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., (1893) 153 U. S.525, 14 Sup.
Ct. 874, 38 L. Ed. 812, interstate canals, Hanson v. United States, (1922)
261 U. S.581, 43 Sup. Ct. 442, 67 L. Ed. 809, lighthouses, Chappel v. United
States, (1895) 160 U. S.499, 16 Sup. Ct. 397, 40 L. Ed. 510, fortifications,
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III. PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE LAW: STATE

The United States Housing Act of 1937 has definitely
established the local housing authority as the public agency entrusted with the tasks of slum-clearance and low-cost housing. To
date thirty states have passed enabling acts which have given birth
to over 100 local housing authorities, and the number is constantly
on the increase. This development is very recent, the first authorities having been created only in 1934 under the influence and
guidance of the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration. Public housing as a municipal activity of clearing slums
and erecting planned low-rent projects is a novel issue in American law. The two main issues that are involved are the power
of eminent domain and the power of taxation. The police power
has been the major means to regulate housing conditions in the
period prior to 1934, when the intervention of the local government agencies in housing was confined to primarily prohibitive
and restrictive measures. Today, in an era of constructive measures
toward a solution of the housing problem, the power of eminent
domain and the spending power of state and local authorities have
come into the forefront.
The first test case to define the powers of a municipal housing
authority was New York City Housing Authority v. Muller.49
It arose already in connection with the first project of the
Authority, called "First Houses." The project involved the entire
Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, (1925) 269 U. S. 55, 16 Sup.
Ct. 433, 40 L. Ed. 583, flood control and irrigation projects, Brown v.

United States, (1923) 263 U. S. 78, 44 Sup. Ct. 92, 68 L. Ed. 171, national
parks, Shoemaker v. United States, (1892) 147 U. S. 282, 13 Sup. Ct. 361,
37 L. Ed. 170, a national memorial, United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Ry. Co., (1896) 160 U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427, 40 L. Ed. 576. In all these
cases the eminent domain was exercised by the federal government on the
basis of powers specifically granted to it. Now that the spending power
of Congress has been recognized as an independent and substantive power
since the Butler Case it would seem at first sight that the case for federal
eminent domain in housing has been strengthened. However, it is very
doubtful whether this assumption is legitimate. In the Butler Case we find
the dictum that the true construction of the "general welfare" clause is that
"the only thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing
funds for payment of the nation's debts and making provision for the
general welfare." The AAA was invalidated in the Butler Case because
coercive measures were linked to the Act based on the "general welfare"
clause. The Social Security Act was distinguished from the AAA by the
absence of coercive measures, and was upheld. These decisions would
indicate that, if the question will ever become practical at all, the federal
government could hardly build a claim for the exercise of eminent domain
in housing on the "general welfare" clause.
49(1935) 155 Misc. Rep. 681, 279 N. Y. S. 299, (1936) 270 N. Y. 333, 1
N. E. 2d 153. The first decision was handed down by the New York supreme
court on April 12, 1935, the second decision by the New York court of
appeals, the highest court of the state, on March 17, 1936.
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rehabilitation of a section in the Lower East Side in New York.
When the Authority sought to acquire two old tenements owned by
one Andrew Muller and others, the owners of the buildings, which
separated two large areas of the planned project, refused to sell
at the prices offered to them by the Authority. The latter therefore instituted condemnation proceedings.
The court held that constructive intervention in housing by the
government was necessary owing to the failure of private enterprise to supply proper habitations, and owing to the inadequacy of
restrictive police measures to combat substandard housing conditions:
"It is true that these restrictive measures have been somewhat
beneficial, but history and experience have shown that they were
inadequate as a cure or to combat successfully the evils of the
conditions they sought to remedy. Something constructive was
essential."
The case was heard again by the New York court of appeals.
the highest tribunal of the state, on March 17, 1936. This decision
was important for two reasons: first, it came just twelve days
after the withdrawal by the federal government of the appeal
from the Louisville Case before the Supreme Court; second, it was
the first time that the highest court of a state passed on the question of whether a state, municipality, or public housing body or a
limited dividend corporation had the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain, given it by state legislation, for purposes of
slum-clearance and low-cost housing projects. In the opinion of
the court, written by judge Crouch, it was held that the condemnation did not constitute, as the tenement-owners averred, a taking
of private property for a private use in violation of the state
constitution5" and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.51
The court points out that the use by the legislature of the power
of taxation and of the police power in dealing with the evils of
the slums had repeatedly been upheld by the courts. It then
discusses the question whether the third power, that of eminent
domain, could be employed for the same purpose:
"Now, in continuation of a battle, which, if not entirely lost,
is far from won, the legislature has restored the last of the trinity
5

0Article 1, section 6 of the constitution of the state of New York reads

in part as follows: ". . . No person shall be . . deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation."

51Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment reads in part as follows:
. Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
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of sovereign powers by giving to a city agency the power of
eminent domain. We are called upon to say whether under the
facts of this case, including the circumstances of time and place,
the use of the power is a use for the public benefit-a public use
-within the law. There is no case in this jurisdiction or elsewhere directly in point. .

.

. There are differences in the nature

and characteristics of the powers, though distinction between them
is often fine. But if the menace is serious enough to the public
to warrant public action, and the power applied is reasonably and
fairly calculated to check it and bears a reasonable relation to the
evil, it seems to be constitutionally immaterial whether one or
another of the sovereign powers is employed. The menace of the
slums in New York City has long been recognized as serious
enough to warrant public action. The session laws for nearly
seventy years past are sprinkled with acts applying the taxing
power and the police power in attempts to cure or check it. The
slums still stand. The menace still exists. What objections,
then, can be urged to the application of the third power, least
drastic, but as here embodied probably the most effective of all?"
Answering the contention that the statute was class legislation,
the Court said:
"But the essential purpose of the legislation is not to benefit
that class or any class; it is to protect and safeguard the entire
public from the menace of the slums."
By upholding the constitutionality of the Municipal Housing
Authorities Law " the Court established the following propositions : 3 (1) That slum clearance and low-cost housing is a public
purpose; (2) that the power of eminent domain may be employed
for acquiring property for these purposes; (3) that public moneys
may be used; (4) that the housing authority may own, operate
and control the projects: (5) that housing authorities serve the
protection, safety, and general welfare of the people; (6) that
bonds of housing authorities are legal obligations; (7) tax exemption on projects and bonds.
The value of the decision in the Muller Case lay also in the fact
that the court adopted in this new legal issue the technique of
carefully scrutinizing all available data relating to the subject of
dispute. instead of delving into general and more abstract discussions of the complex problem of eminent domain, as was notably
the case in United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville.
With the great power of moral persuasion which the decisions of
the New York court of appeals command over the highest tribunals
in many other states, it was also to be expected that the directness
52New York, Laws 1934, ch. 4.
53Cf. Third Annual Report, Vol. 1, 1936, p. 226, published by the New
York City Housing Authority.
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and forcefulness of the opinion would serve as a guidance in the
reasoning of other courts. Finally the Muller Case was one of the
decisive factors in speeding up the trend toward decentralization
of public housing in this country. The withdrawal by the federal
government of the Louisville Case before the Supreme Court
occurred only a few days before the appellate decision in the MIuller
Case, and when the latter established that the state could exercise
the power of eminent domain where the federal government could
not, it was obvious that public housing projects would be taken over
by the local government housing authorities. The United States
Housing Act of 1937 not only restricts the United States Housing
Authority to functions of finance and co-ordination of standards,
but also provides that all federal projects shall be handed over as
soon as practicable to local housing bodies.
The next case involving the legal issues in slum-clearance and
low-cost housing by local government agencies was Spahn v.
Stewart.'4 The lands involved were the same as in United States
v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, in which the federal
government was denied the power of eminent domain in a similar
project.
The court, following closely and quoting extensively from the
Muller decision, sustained the constitutionality of the Municipal
Housing Commission Law of Kentucky, and also held: (1) that
the proposed slum-clearance and housing project was for a public
and governmental purpose, and, therefore, that land could be
condemned for the project; (2) that the bonds and property of
the Municipal Housing Commission are public and, therefore,
tax exempt under the laws of Kentucky; (3) that the Municipal
Housing Commission may issue its special obligation bonds payable exclusively from the revenues of the project, and that such
bonds are not obligations of the state or any political subdivision
thereof; (4) that the provision of housing facilities for persons
of low income is not class legislation but for the benefit of the
whole community; (5) that the City of Louisville had the power
to appropriate moneys to the Municipal Housing Commission to
cover administrative and other initial costs.
The question of the necessity for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain is addressed to the legislature, while the question of whether or not the use to which the proposed condemned
property be put is a public use or purpose, is one to be determined
54(1937) 268 Ky. 97, 103 S. W. (2d) 651.
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Slum-clearance without the power of conby the judiciary."
demnation is an impossible task. Slums usually comprise large
areas, and can be rehabilitated only on a large-scale basis. The
value of individual new buildings would be annihilated by the
adjoining dilapidated dwellings. Apart from that, the slum problem
is not only a problem of adequate re-housing, but also of replanning
the character of a whole neighborhood. Only large-scale projects
can achieve both increased and better services and amenities for
the new community, and at the same time bring about economies
and savings which will make the new housing facilities accessible
to the incomes of the former slum dwellers. Since secret acquisition of the land required is impossible owing to the publicity of
low-cost housing developments to-day, it is common knowledge
that there are always a number of property owners who can and
do hold a long time. Especially owners of unmortgaged properties
have proved to be in a commanding bargaining position. Official
inquiries have shown that the complete assembling of four contingent blocks in developed sections of a large city like New York,
which is the necessary minimum for economical operation, is
economically impossible by making use of the ordinary methods of
In New York, for example, for which accurate
land acquisition.
the owners claimed 204 million dollars
compiled,
been
data have
for acquiring land for various
proceedings
condemnation
in 371
public uses in the years 1926 to 1930. The City's experts estimated
the value of the land at 107 million dollars. The awards totalled
157 million dollars, a little more than halfway between the claimants' and the City's estimates.5 7 Since in low-rent housing projects
every dollar paid per square foot of land increases the rental by
$.40 to $1.00 per room per month, it is obvious that low-cost housing without low-cost land is hardly feasible. While this fact alone
would not by itself conclusively solve the question of slum-clearing
and low-cost housing as a public use within the meaning of the
8
law, the courts have admitted it as an important consideration.
55
Spahn v. Stewart, (1937) 268 Ky. 97, 103 S. W. (2d) 651, and
cases 1cited there.

51Cf. Report of the New York Commission on Housing and Regional
Planning, Legislative Document 1926, No. 66. The Reports of the New
York State Housing Board for the years 1932 and 1933 also contain valuable data relevant to this question.
;Introduction, p. IV, of the Report on Law and Procedure in Condemnation Applicable to Proceedings Brought by the City of New York,
submitted to Hon. Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corporation Counsel, City of New
York by Leonard W. Wallstein, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel
(1932).
5
SFallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, (1896) 164 U. S. 112, 17
Sup. Ct. 56, 41 L. Ed. 369; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,
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Since the passage of the Wagner-Steagall Act three important
cases dealing with slum-clearance and low-cost housing have all
upheld the rulings of New York City Housing Authority v. Muller
and Spahn v. Stewart. In Wells v. Housing Authority of the
City of Wilmington," decided by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina on May 24, 1938, a taxpayer had brought action to test
the constitutionality of the State Housing act. The supreme court
of North Carolina held that the Housing Authority of the City
of Wilmington constitutes a public body "exercising public power,
and has all the powers necessary and convenient to carry out and
effectuate the purposes and provisions of said Housing Authorities
Law." In particular the court ruled that the housing authority
could exercise the powers of eminent domain and taxation, and
that real and personal property held by the authority is exempt
from state or local taxes. It also held that bonds, indentures and
obligations issued by the housing authority constitute no debt or
liability of the city, since the housing authority is not an administrative agency of the city, but a separate and distinct municipal
corporation entitled to the privileges, immunities and rights of a
municipal corporation. In June 1938, both the supreme court of
Louisiana, in State ex rel. Gaston L. Porteris, Attorney General,
v. Housing Authority of New Orleans and the supreme court
0
of Pennsylvania, in Dorman v. PhiladelphiaHousing Authority,
have closely followed New York City Housing Authority v. Muller,
Spahn v. Stewart, and Wells v. Wilmington. The problems of
eminent domain, expenditure of public moneys, tax exemption of
property held by housing authorities, have all been favorably
decided in all these recent cases.
New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, Spahn v.
Stewart, Wells v. Wilmington, Porteris v. New Orleans, and
Dornianv. Philadelphiaare so far the first cases in which the direct
issue is decided that the power of eminent domain can be exercised
for purposes of slum-clearance and low-cost housing. The other
two powers of the state, with regard to public housing, the police
(1906) 200 U. S. 527, 56 Sup. Ct. 301, 50 L. Ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174.
Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1917) sec. 42 writes as follows: "Courts
have been more ready to uphold a particular use of land as public when,
from the nature of the undertaking, it was impossible or difficult to carry it
out without the aid of eminent domain than when a particular site was not
essential, and a suitable one could be secured equally well by purchase."
59(1938) 213 N. C. 744. 197 S.E. 693.
60(1938) 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725.
61(1938) 331 Pa. St. 209, 200 AtI. 834. See also Opinion of the Justices,
(1938) 235 Ala. 485, 179 So. 535, in which tax exemption of property held
by housing authorities was affirmed.
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power and the power of taxation look back on a longer and better
settled history.
The most important decisions where the police power has been
tested with regard to unsanitary and dangerous housing conditions
are in the State of New York, where the slum problem always has
been and still is the most pressing in the whole country. In Health
Department of the City of New York v. Rector, etc., of Trinity
Church*" the following issue was decided: Trinity Church owned
several houses in New York City, and the Health Department
of the City had ordered the Church to install appliances to receive
and distribute a supply of water for domestic use on each floor of
each of the houses. The Church was fined a penalty for noncompliance with the order, whereupon it appealed upon the ground
that the legislation requiring the water to be furnished was unconstitutional, violating due process of law, and not within the
police powers of the state. The New York court of appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the statute as a proper exercise of the police
power, and said in its opinion:
"We cannot say as a legal proposition that it tends only to the
convenience of the tenants in regard to their use of water ...
The supply of water to the general public in a city has become not
only a luxury, but an absolute necessity for the maintenance of
public health and safety."
Nine years later, in 1904, the New York court of appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the New York Tenement House Law of
1901 in Ten ement House Department v. Moeschen53 The Law
provided for new standards of light, air and increased fire protection. In its opinion the court said:
"It belongs to that class of police regulation to which private
rights are held subject and is founded upon the right of the public
to protect itself from nuisances and to preserve the general health.
The authority of the legislature to pass laws of this character is too
well settled to be questioned."
In 1929 the New York Legislature passed the Multiple Dwelling
Act, which provided still more progressive building standards than
had the Tenement House Law of 1901. It also required owners
of "old law" tenements, i.e., those which were built prior to 1901,
to effect alterations in their houses designed to comply with the
new standards of health and safety. In Adler v. Deegan64 the New
62(1895) 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, 27 L. R. A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep.
579.

r3(1904) 179 N. Y. 325, 72 N. E. 231, 70 L. R. A. 704, 103 Am. St.

Rep. 910, aff'd (1904) 203 U. S. 583, 27 Sup. Ct. 781, 51 L. Ed. 328.
-4(1929) 251 N. Y. 467, 167 N. E. 705.
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York court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Multiple
Dwelling Act.
Mr. Justice Cardozo, then on the bench of the New York court
of appeals, said in a concurring opinion:
"The Multiple Dwelling Act is aimed at many evils, but most of
all it is a measure to eradicate the slum. It seeks to bring about
conditions whereby healthy children shall be born, and healthy men
and women reared, in the dwellings of the great metropolis.... The
end to be achieved is more than the avoidance of pestilence or
contagion. The end to be achieved is the quality of men and
women ....

If the moral and physical fibre of its manhood and

its womanhood is not a State concern the question is, what is."
In 1936 the constitutionality of the Multiple Dwelling Act was
again upheld in Adamnec v. Post," although the expense of alterations required by the Law amounted to 60 per cent of the property.
In the opinion the court said: "Because the state has tolerated slum
dwellings in the past, it is not precluded from taking appropriate
steps to end them in the future."
Another type of cases in which the police power as regarding
housing was the main issue, was dealt with by the courts in the
years following the War. The best known leading case in this
category is Block v. Hirsh6 which upheld the constitutionality of
rent regulation in the District of Columbia. Mr. Justice Holmes,
in delivering the opinion of the majority, said:
"The general proposition to be maintained is that circumstances
have clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia
with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law.
Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space
as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other
places would be a matter of purely private concern ....

Housing

is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control are present."
The importance of this dictum of Mr. Justice Holmes lies in
the fact that it does not attempt to give a categorical answer to
the question whether rent regulation or any other subject connected
with housing is a matter of public control and regulation, but
makes the answer depend upon the particular circumstances of each
case. Mr. Justice Holmes also points out that although a legislative
declaration of facts establishing a public use may not be held
conclusive by the courts, "it is entitled at least to great respect."
In addition, the opinion warns against the misconception that
housing is not a matter of public regulation and does not constitute
65(1936) 273 N. Y. 250, 7 N. E. (2d) 120.
6(1921) 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865, 16 A. L. R. 165.
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a public purpose because in its immediate aspects it is manifest only
in private transactions, and, second, because each specific thing
affected is not used by the public generally.
Block 7v.Hirsh was later followed in many other decisions, the
7
best known of which are Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman
Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel,"8 and People ex rel. Durham Realty
0
Corporation v. La Fctra.
OThe La Fetra Case, dealing with the
New York legislation in the matter; contains perhaps the best
discussion of the economic factors which, under certain circumstances make housing a public purpose:
"While in theory it may be said that the building of houses is
not a monopolistic privilege; that houses are not public utilities
like railroads and that if the landlord turns one off another may
take him in; that rents are fixed by economic rules and the market
value is the reasonable value; that people often move from one
city to another to secure better advantages; that no one is compelled to have a home in New York; that no crisis exists; that to
call the legislation an exercise of the police power when it is
plainly a taking of private property for private use and without
compensation is a mere transfer of labels which does not affect the
nature of the legislation, yet the legislature has found that in practice the state of demand and supply is at present abnormal; that no
one builds because it is unprofitable to build, that those who own
seek the uttermost farthing from those who choose to live in New
York and pay for the privilege rather than go elsewhere; and that
profiteering and oppression have become general. It is with this
condition and not with economic
theory that the state has to deal
' '7
in the existing emergency.

The first efforts in the United States as well as in most other
countries to combat slums took the form of state and municipal
statutes and ordinances authorizing the demolition of faulty,
dangerous, or insanitary structures. This method was employed
under the police power. The constitutionality of using the police
7
power in this direction is now well established. '
67(1921) 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed. 877.

68(1922) 230 N. Y. 634, 130 N. E. 923, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289,
66 L. Ed. 595.
89(1921) 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16 A. L. R. 152.
70The last sentence in this opinion is reminiscent of Mr. Justice Holmes'
dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup.
Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937, in which the majority held a New York statute
unconstitutional which limited the working hours in bakeries to 60 a week:
"This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain .... The fourteenth amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.... A constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire."
York v. Hargadine. (1919) 142 Minn. 219, 171 N. W. 773; Runge
v. Glerum, (1917) 37 N. D. 618, 164 N. W. 284; Jackson v. Bell, (1920) 143

910
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Another procedure of regulating housing under the police
power is the control of building lines and the protection of future
street reservations. In practically all cases in which the issue of
building lines has been dealt with, the constitutionality of the
statutes or ordinances has been upheld.7 2 The protection of future
street reservations has not been so firmly established as yet, at
least not in all states, but a careful analysis of the cases in question
has brought out the result that "the courts appear to be coming
gradually to the point of view that these particular public interests
are sufficiently important to justify the use of the police power in
'73
their protection.
Zoning and planning have established themselves as two other
methods under the police power of regulating public interests,
which also vitally affect housing conditions. Comprehensive zoning
legislation providing for the control of the use, height and area of
buildings in cities, towns and counties is in effect in all forty-eight
Tenn. 452, 226 S. W. 207. For Municipal Condemnation of Buildings in
Wisconsin, cf. (1933) 28 The Municipality (League of Wisconsin Municipalities)
153.
72

Favorable decisions: Pritz v. Messner, (1925) 112 Oh. St. 628, 149
N. E. 30; Wulfsohn v. Burden, (1925) 241 N. Y. 288, 150 N. E. 120; Harris
v. State ex rel. Ball, (1926) 23 Ohio App. 33, 155 N. E. 166; Weiss v.
Guion, (N.D. Ohio 1926) 17 F. (2d) 202; Gorieb v. Fox, (1927) 274
U. S. 603, 47 Sup. Ct. 675, 71 L. Ed. 1228; Thille v. Board of Public
Works, (1927) 82 Cal. App. 187, 255 Pac. 294; Slack v. Building Inspector,
(1928) 262 Mass. 404, 160 N. E. 285; Sundeen v. Rogers, (1928) 83 N. H.
253, 141 Atl. 142; Bouchard v. Zetley, (1928) 196 Wis. 625, 220 N. W.
209; Young v. West Hartford, (1930) 111 Conn. 27, 149 At. 205; Town
of Islip v. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., (1931) 257 N. Y. 167, 177 N. E.
409. An unfavorable decision: State ex rel. Wittenberg v. Board of
Appeals of the City of West Allis, (circuit court of Milwaukee County, Wis.
1928). Cf. Swan, Theory and Practice in Building Lines Under Eminent
Domain, (1931) 20 Nat. Mun. Rev. 557; Black, Building Lines and Reservations for Future Streets (1935) 124 (this is a study under the auspices of the
Harvard University School of City Planning) ; Landels, Legal Aspects of
Building Line Ordinances, (1928) 93 Architect and Engineer 99; Bettman,
Recent Trends in Building Lines, Subdivision Control and the Acquisition of
Open Spaces, (1929) Proceedings, 21st National Conference on City Planning 102; Sheridan, Building Line Zoning, (1925) 51 Proceedings of
American
Society of Civil Engineers 214.
73
Black, Building Lines and Reservations for Future Streets (1935)
117. Some more important favorable decisions: Re Furman St., (1836) 17
Wend. (N.Y.) 649; Re District of the City of Pittsburgh, (1841) 2 W. &
S.320; Forbes Street, (1871) 70 Pa. St. 125; Bush v. McKeesport, (1895)
166 Pa. St. 57, 30 Atl. 1023; Halsell v. Ferguson, (1918) 109 Tex. 144, 202
S. W. 317; Windsor v. Whitney, (1920) 95 Conn. 357, 111 Atl. 354, 12
A. L. R. 669; Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, (1928) 241 Mich.
468, 217 N. W. 58; Prudential Co-Operative Realty Co. v. Youngstown,
(1928) 118 Ohio St. 204, 160 N. E. 695. Some unfavorable decisions:
Moale v. Baltimore, (1854) 5 Md. 314; State v. Carragan, (1872) 36
N. J.L. 52; Baltimore v. Hook, (1884) 62 Md. 371; Edwards v. Bruorton.
(1904) 184 Mass. 529, 69 N. E. 328; Kittinger v. Rossman, (1921) 12
Del. Ch. 276, 110 Atl. 677; Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Anderson, (1931) 184 Ark. 763, 43 S.W. 2d 356.
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states and in the District of Columbia. "A Standard State Enabling Act" prepared by the Advisory Committee on Zoning of the
Department of Commerce has been adopted by thirty-six states.
Pursuant to the state enabling acts zoning ordinances are in effect
in about 1,300 municipalities and townships, representing a population of fifty million people, or 70 per cent of the urban population
of the United States. New York State has the greatest number
of zoned cities, i.e., 215, covering a population of over ten million.
California and Illinois range next. The leading case on zoning is
'Village of Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Co.7 4 in which the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld the validity of a zoning
ordinance of Euclid, Ohio, which excluded all industrial establishments from a given area, and also regulated the use of the property,
the height of the buildings, and the type of materials to be used in
the construction of the buildings. The law of zoning is too recent
to be settled in all aspects, but, as was said in a recent decision,
and
"Courts take cognizance of public and social developments
''
balance them as best as they can against private rights. M
An analysis of all the relevant decisions by both state and
federal courts thus establishes the legal use of the police power in
its various aspects with regard to public housing beyond any doubt.
What is the position with regard to the taxing power of the states?
This question, just as that of the power of eminent domain, refers
to the right of the states not only to eliminate evils and abuses by
control and regulation, as under the police power, but by directly
entering the housing field in the form of slum-clearance and lowcost housing. The constitutional issue whether expenditures for
public housing as a method of actual provision of housing facilities
by local government agencies are expenditures for a public purpose
within the meaning of the law. Although the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment contains no specific limitation upon
the right of taxation in the states, it has come to be settled that the
authority of the states to tax does not include the right to impose
taxes for merely private purposes."
77
the only
The leading case on this issue is Green v. Fraier.
case in which the Supreme Court of the United States had to pass
74(1926) 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A. L. R. 1016.
75VWest Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, (1937) 169 Va. 271,
192 S. E. 881; appeal dismissed by the Supreme Court of the United
(1938) 302 U. S. 781. 58 Sup. Ct. 480, 82 L. Ed. 603.
States.
70
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, (1896) 164 U. S. 112, 17
Sup. Ct. 56, 41 L. Ed. 399; Green v. Frazier, (1920) 253 U. S. 233, 40
Sup. 7Ct. 499, 64 L. Ed. 878.
' See note 76.
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upon the question of public use and public purpose as relating to
public housing. The right of the state to exercise the power of
taxation for public housing was sustained. The background of
the case is interesting in so far as the North Dakota Act, of which
the housing scheme was only one portion, was probably the most
advanced piece of legislation conferring upon a state authority to
enter hitherto unknown spheres of activity.
The next state case after Green v. Frazier, in which public
housing as a public purpose within the meaning of the taxing power
was the main issue, came up in California in Veterans' Welfare
79
Board v. Jordan.78 In this case the Veterans' Welfare Bond Act,
authorizing a bond issue to carry out the provisions of the Veterans'
Farm and Home Purchasing Act, 80 was challenged as to its constitutionality. The plan contemplated by the Veterans' Farm and
Home Purchasing Act was substantially the following: it provided
for a single man scheme and for a collective land settlement scheme.
In the single man scheme the veteran selects the farm or the home
which he desires to purchase, and notifies the Veterans' Welfare
Board of his intention to buy a particular piece of property. If
the Board approves of the application, it buys the land with the
money derived from the bond issue, and sells it to the veteran for
the same price plus interest, the money to be repaid to the state
over a period up to forty years. The land settlement scheme provides for the use of the proceeds of the bonds in connection with
the purchase, improvement, subdivision, and sale of large tracts
of land. Here the state pays the purchase price of the land and
sells to the veteran on long terms of credit.
The court held the single man scheme unconstitutional, but
sustained the land settlement scheme. In the first "no benefit
accrued to the state other than the indirect one involved in the
reward of the veteran," while in the second "there is carried out
a policy of land settlement. In the case of the land settlement
provision an object is achieved ther than the mere extending of
credit to veterans." Once the main purpose of the land settlement
scheme is established as a public purpose, it is immaterial "that
incidental to the main purpose there was an advantage to the
purchaser of the land ultimately derived from the credit of the
state."
The importance of Veterans' Welfare Board v. Jordan lies not
78(1922) 89 Cal. 124, 208 Pac. 284, 22 A. L. R. 1515.
7['California,
Stat. 1921, ch. 959.
80
California, Stat. 1921, ch. 815.
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only in its reads, and complete acceptance of Green v. Prazieras a
ruling precedent, but also in its distinction between a single man
and a collective scheme. Public housing, to fall under the concept
of public purpose within the meaning of the law, can only refer to
collective groups whose housing problem affects the entire community, and which can be solved only on a collective basis. The
quality of this aspect of the housing problem as a public purpose
is not impaired by the fact that the individual tenants who are
rehoused, derive a benefit from this type of scheme. These individual benefits are only incidental to the main objective of ridding
the community of blighted areas infested with crime and disease.
On the other hand we remember United States v. Certain Lands in
the City of Louisville, where the district court had refused to see
in slum-clearance and low-cost housing a public purpose in terms
of federal or state powers, and had viewed the relationships between governmental agency and rehoused tenants in isolation, and
not within the wider framework of a state and even nation-wide
effort to rid the cities of slums.
The next case, in which public housing as a public purpose
within the taxing power was decided, was again in California,
Wilhnon v. Powell.sl Article 25 of the charter of the City of Los
Angeles provided for a municipal housing commission which was
authorized to incur debts by the issuance of bonds in the name of
the City of Los Angeles, and to provide by purchase, lease, condemnation, construction or otherwise homes for those who might
otherwise live in overcrowded tenements, unhealthy slums, or the
most congested areas.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the charter providing
for the Municipal Housing Commission. Quoting at great length
from Ucterans' Welfare Board v. Jordan, it said in the opinion:
"If those observations were justified in that case, with equal
reason it may be said that an enterprise of the kind contemplated by
the charter provisions concerning the municipal housing commission, which has for its purpose the elimination of overcrowded
tenements, unhealthy slums, and congested areas, thereby tending
to ward off epidemics of disease and preserve the health of all the
inhabitants of a city, is a public purpose."
The argument of class legislation was answered by the court
as follows:
"The fact that in the course of administration of the affairs
of the commission, private persons will receive benefit, as tenants
or otherwise, is not sufficient to take away from the enterprise the
81 (1928) 91 Cal. App. 1, 266 Pac. 1029.
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characteristics of a public purpose."
Wilimon v.Powell is important because it is closer related to
slum-clearance and low-cost housing, the vital problems of to-day,
than either Green v. Frazieror Veterans' Welfare Boardv. Jordan.
In Simon v. O'Toole"2 a city ordinance of Newark, N. J., reciting the desirability in the interest of public health, safety and
morals, of replacing certain blocks of unsafe and unsanitary
dwellings with new housing facilities constructed according to the
proper standards of sanitation and safety and provided with appropriate parks and playgrounds, was held to contemplate public funds
for a public- purpose, and was held to be constitutional and valid.
The project was slum-clearance in two blocks in Newark, and was
carried out by the Prudential Insurance Company of America.
The city pledged itself to buy with its own funds a strip of land
between the two blocks to be used as a park and play-ground,
established public uses. The case was fought on this issue, although
it was obvious that the real reason behind the city's transaction
was the desire to reduce the total cost of the new project by contributing out of its own funds toward the cost of the land.
Slum-clearance and low-cost housing as a public purpose was
also upheld in the New York tax-exemption cases under the State
Housing Law of 1926.82 This law provided for slum-clearance
through private limited dividend corporations, and granted these
corporations tax exemption from all state taxes, while the municipalities were authorized by the Law to exempt the buildings
and improvements, but not the land, in the projects of such corporations from local real estate taxes. The plaintiff corporation, which
was not such a limited dividend corporation, contended in Mars
Realty Corporation v. Sexton 4 that it was being discriminated
against unreasonably and that the Act deprived it of the equal
protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of
the constitution of the United States. Tax exemption for the
private limited dividend corporations was upheld as constitutional.
This case, as well as a few others,8" are significant for two
reasons: first, they show that some state courts like those of New
York are willing to recognize slum-clearance and low-cost housing
82(1931) 108 N. J.L. 52, 155 Atl. 449; Aff'd in (1932) 108 N. J.L.
549, 158 Atl. 543. The city ordinance in question was issued pursuant to
chapters
201 and 202 of the New Jersey Laws of 1929.
83
New York, Laws 1926, ch. 823.
84(1931) 141 Misc. Rep. 622, 253 N. Y. S. 15.
85
Matter of Mount Hope Development Corporation v. James, (1932)
258 N. Y. 510, 180 N. E. 252; Roche v. Sexton, (1935) 268 N. Y. 594, 198
N. E. 420.
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as public purposes even when the projects are owned and operated
by private companies, provided they maintain limited dividends
and are subject to the control and supervision of the State Housing
Board. Second, the conclusion is legitimate, that tax exemption
disputes concerning municipal housing authorities will be decided
favorably, since tax exemption for private, limited dividend, corporations has been upheld as valid.",
The only state in which decisions hostile to public housing
have been rendered is Massachusetts. In 1872 a fire occurred in
Boston which was so serious and so ruinous to the wealth and
industry of the city that the Legislature of Massachusetts adopted
a special Act empowering the city to issue bonds and lend the
proceeds to persons who had suffered losses of property owing to
the fire. A taxpayer brought an action against the city to enjoin
it from issuing the bonds on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional, in Lowell v. City of Boston. s7 The supreme judicial

court of Massachusetts held the Act unconstitutional, because it
would necessitate expenditure of public moneys for private and not
for public purposes.
In 1912 the Legislature of Massachusetts sought to pass a law
enabling a state agency financed by state funds to buy, rent and
sell real estate for the purpose of providing homes to mechanics,
laborers or other wage earners. In re Opinion of Justices8 declared the proposed bill unconstitutional on the following ground:
"It may be urged that the measure is aimed at mitigating the
evils of overcrowded tenements and unhealthy slums. These evils
are a proper subject for the exercise of the police power. Through
the enactment of building ordinances, regulation and inspection as
to housing and provisions for light and air lies a broad field for the
suppression of mischiefs of this kind."
In 1915 the constitution of Massachusetts was amended so as
to confer express power upon the legislature to establish state
agencies with the authorities to take land and build upon it homes
for the purpose of relieving congested population areas. In re
9
held this constitutional amendment not
Opinion of the Justices"
include
the business of lending money upon
broad enough to
mortgages on real estate through a corporation to be created and
financed by the state.
In all three instances the courts of Massachusetts have shown
86
The most recent decision declaring property of housing authorities
tax exempt is Opinion of the Justices, (1938) 235 Ala. 485, 179 So. 535.
87(1873) 111 fass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39.
H.(1912) 211 Mass. 624. 98 N. E. 611.
89(1935) 291 Mass. 567, 195 N. E. 897, 98 A. L. R. 1364.
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themselves hostile to state intervention in the housing field, but it
would be mistaken to attach undue importance to any of the three
opinions. The major housing problem to-day is slum-clearance
and low-cost housing, and it is submitted that the Massachusetts
opinions bear relatively little on this issue. In Lowell v. City of
Boston no question of public housing was involved at all; the issue
was whether state funds can be appropriated for owners of damaged properties. And again In re Opinion of the Justices of the
year 1935 dealt with the question of whether the state could go
into the business of lending money upon mortgages on real estate,
and did not touch at all the specific housing problem of to-day,
viz., the constitutionality of slum-clearance and low-cost housing
by local government agencies. The only one of the three opinions
which somewhat resembles our contemporary housing problem is
In re Opinion of the Justices of the year 1912.
It is necessary to remember the following points, though, in
order to see that opinion in its right perspective. The housing
schemes to-day for which constitutionality is sought, do not address
themselves to certain classes ot the population, but are designed
to rehabilitate blighted areas and to provide families of all classes,
whether wage earners or not, with decent housing facilities unless
their income exceeds a fixed limit. They are collective schemes like
those held constitutional in Veterans' Welfare Board v. Jordan,
while the housing scheme as contemplated in the Massachusetts act
of 1912 and held unconstitutional in In re Opinion of the Justices
of the same year, resembles the single man scheme of the California
act held invalid in Veterans' Welfare Board v. Jordan. In both
cases the beneficiaries of state funds were collectively defined only
in so far as in the one case they had to be veterans, and in the other
mechanics, laborers or other wage earners. But in both instances
the actual provision of housing was dissolved in innumerable individual operations, with no standards being set for the range of
income of the families to be provided for, nor for any particular
areas in which the program was to be carried out. Viewed in
their proper perspective the Massachusetts opinions are relevant
for the problem of whether the state can go into the business of
lending money or insuring mortgages on real estate, but hardly
bear upon the main issue of to-day of whether the state can engage
in slum-clearance and low-cost housing.
An analysis of all the relevant decisions thus establishes the
right of the states to use the taxing power for purposes of slum-
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clearance and low-cost housing. Both federal and state courts,
with the exception of the state of Massachusetts, have even upheld
the right to use the taxing power in aspects of public housing
which are much less urgent than slum-clearance and low-cost
housing. The Supreme Court has dealt extensively with the whole
question in Green v. Frazier,and the decision is not only important
for its recognition of public housing as a public purpose within
the taxing power of the states, but also for its reiteration of the
Supreme Court's willingness to accept the findings of state legislative and judicial bodies unless they be clearly unfounded. There
is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court to-day would not
again uphold the constitutionality of employing the taxing power
of the states for purposes of public housing, especially since many
new functions of states have been recognized by the Supreme
Court as public purposes in the last eighteen years. The tendency
since Green v. Frazier has been to widen the range of legitimate
state activities. In Green v. Frazier the Supreme Court said that
this was the first case in which it had to deal with the issue of the
states' right to use the taxing power for public housing. At first
sight it is somewhat surprising that the Supreme Court found in
Jones v. City of Portland0 the "nearest approach" to the question
presented in Green v. Frazier. In Jones v. City of Portland a
Maine statute was upheld which authorized cities or towns to
establish and maintain wood, coal and fuel yards for the purpose
of selling these necessaries to the inhabitants. The case was a
milestone in the evolution of American public law, in so far as it
marked a departure from the earlier concept of state and municipal
functions which were assumed not to interfere with private enterprise except in cases of natural monopolies. Fuel yards certainly
did not represent natural monopolies, but they resemble the former
cases held constitutional 9' in one important aspect in that they,
too, were indispensable necessities of life. "When we speak of
fuel," the Court said, "we are dealing not with ordinary articles of
merchandise for which there may be many substitutes, but with
an indispensable necessity of life." This is the decisive element
which Jones v. City of Portlandand Green v. Frazierhave in com90(1917) 245 U. S. 217, 38 Sup. Ct. 112, 62 L. Ed. 252.
91Municipal enterprises held constitutional included waterworks, Cornstock v. Syracuse, (1889) 25 N. Y. St. Rep. 611, 5 N. Y. S. 874, electric
light plants, Middleton v. St. Augustine, (1900) 42 Fla. 287, 29 So. 421, gas
works. Hamilton Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, (Ohio 6th
Cir. 1918) 165 C. C. A. 449, 254 Fed. 39. street railways, Townsend v.
Boston, (1905) 187 Mass. 283, 72 N. E. 991. Cf. McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, (1929-30) 18 Cal. L. Rev. 137, 241.
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mon. Besides, there is still another common element which is
2
perhaps not less significant: In Laughlin z. City of Portland"
court
the
which also upheld as constitutional municipal fuel yards,
pointed out in the opinion that the statute was sustained not only
because fuel represented a necessity of life, but also because private
competition had broken down in that line of business so that the
public was exposed to monopolistic exploitation. This second
element, too, applies to public housing because it has been
established beyond doubt that private enterprise has failed to meet
the housing needs of at least one-third to one-half of the population of the United States. In 1927 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of municipal filling stations for the sale of gasoline
3
and oil in StandardOil Co. v. City of Lincoh on similar grounds.
On the face of the available facts it can hardly be doubted that
public housing as a problem affecting the welfare of the entire
community contains the two elements of necessity of life and of
breakdown of private competition at least to the same degree as do
municipal fuel yards and filling stations. It is doubtful whether
"as far as the Supreme Court is concerned there is no real limit
' 94
to state and municipal activity in the field of business enterprise,
as has been suggested by a well-known student of the problem of
public purpose in taxation; but whether this general proposition be
valid or not, public housing presents the criteria of being a necessity
of life and of supplementing a failure of private enterprise to meet
urgent wants of the people, so that it is a public purpose as
applicable to the taxing power of the states.
The police power as well as the power of taxation of the states
and low-cost housing are, as the examination of
slum-clearance
in
supported by a great number of precedents
shown,
has
cases
the
of the Supreme Court. The question
decisions
favorable
including
is somewhat less settled. So
connection
this
in
domain
of eminent
v. Muller, Spahn v.
Authority
Housing
City
York
New
far only
Orleans, and DorNew
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Porteris
Wilmington,
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Stewart, Wells
issue of the
specific
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with
dealt
have
man v. Philadelphia
and
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all
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and
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decision
sustained. No unfavorable
First
future.
the
in
occur
will
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and it seems very unlikely that
92(1914) 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318.

93(1927) 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172, aff'd in 275 U. S. 504, 48 Sup.
72 L. Ed. 395.
155,
Ct.
94McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, (1929-30) 18 Cal. L. Rev.
137, 248.
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of all, an inquiry into the relation between the three types of powers
of the states leads us to the conclusion that if the courts have
consistently upheld the constitutionality of the use of the police
power and of the taxing power for purposes of public housing,
it can be assumed that, especially after the Muller Case and Spahn
v. Stcuart, they will continue to sustain the use of the power of
eminent domain as well. If public housing has been sustained as a
public purpose in taxation and police power cases, it is legitimate
to predict that the use of the power of eminent domain by the
states will be admitted by the courts when housing projects cannot
be achieved in any other way. There are of course differences
between the three powers, though the distinction is admittedly a
fine one and hardly capable of a clear-cut delineation.
"But if the menace is serious enough to the public to warrant
public action, and the power applied is reasonably and fairly
calculated to check it and bears a reasonable relation to the evil,
it seems to be constitutionally immaterial whether one or another
of the sovereign powers is employed." 5
This limitation is not serious, since the requirement of a reasonable relation between the evil to be checked and the means applied
to it, is a general condition of state action, and in no way confined
to the power of eminent domain. We have pointed out before
that according to the findings of various public investigations in
New York and other states slum-clearance projects cannot be
carried out without the power of condemnation, since slums usually
comprise large areas, and the very purpose to be achieved, viz.,
low-rent housing of decent standards, would be frustrated from
the outset if the housing authorities were compelled to pay excessive prices of greedy property owners. It is neither good common sense nor good law that a state or a municipality should have
the right to use its taxing power for paying excessive land prices,
and be deprived of the right to use the power of eminent domain
for obtaining the same land for an acknowledged public purpose.
We remember that in low-rent housing projects every dollar paid
per square foot of land increases the rental by $.40 to $1.00 per
room per month, and that the City of New York, for instance, in
its condemnation proceedings in the years 1926-1930 had to pay
157 million dollars only instead of the 204 million claimed by the
property owners.
The position of the power of eminent domain is different in
case of the federal government and in that of the states. The
'Mr. Justice Crouch in New York Housing Authority v. Muller, (1936)
270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E. (2d) 153.
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federal government may exercise the power of eminent domain
only in aid of one of the enumerated powers granted to it by the
constitution; the interpretation of the "general welfare" clause in
the Butler Case and even in the more liberal Social Security Act
Cases limits federal action for the "general welfare" to appropriations of money, and does not admit of other legislation deriving
its validity from the "general welfare" clause. In particular, the
Butler decision condemned federal coercive measures in aid of
appropriations under the "general welfare" clause, and the Social
Security Cases were distinguished from the Butler Case precisely
on the ground that no coercive measures or provisions were linked
with the federal appropriations. If the "general welfare" clause
should undergo a further step in its liberal interpretation, it is
conceivable that the limitation to appropriations will be dropped,
and then legislation for the general welfare including the exercise
of the power of eminent domain may be admitted by the courts.
As the law stands to-day, federal action for the general welfare
seems to be limited to appropriations of money, although of course
certain minimum standards for its use may be attached. This
limitation, though, of the power to provide for the general welfare
does not exist in the case of the states. The state can use for the
general welfare of its inhabitants any of the sovereign powers,
because the state is not a government of limited and specifically
enumerated powers like the federal government. Unless subject
to a superior federal power the state can use any of its sovereign
powers for recognized public purposes, with the restriction under
due process that the power employed must bear a reasonable relation to the evil to be remedied.
We live to-day in a period in which the focus of economic and
political thinking is shifting from the concept of production to
that of distribution. From the seventies of the last century to the
twenties of this century, this country witnessed a period of rapid
construction and industrialization which concentrated all its
energies and all its thought to construct, to build, to produce. This
was also the period in which problems of just distribution had to
recede before the claims of rapid and comprehensive construction.
In these fifty years property rights found more protection in the
courts than ever before or afterwards. State intervention in the
form of price regulation, wage limits, hours of work, unemployment relief, aid for the needy, were defeated by courts which
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reflected the temper of the time in which they functioned. 98 Those
fifty years also witnessed a construction of public use under
eminent domain which more and more limited that concept to use
by governmental agencies and use by the general public. Where
ostensible interests of production and development of natural resources were involved, then and then only the rigidity of the
interpretation was liberalized to such a degree that no use by the
public was required, as long as the productive wealth of the state
was indirectly increased. Before this era of rapid construction
and production courts held that the power of eminent domain
"may be exercised not only for the public safety, but also where the
interest, or even the convenience, of the state or its inhabitants, is
concerned. 9'

7

Now again signs are visible that those old ideas,

interrupted by a period of intensive protection of private property
rights, are coming to the fore again:
"Public uses are not limited, in the modern view, to matters
of mere business and necessity and ordinary convenience, but may
extend to matters of public health, recreation, and enjoyment....
A road need not be for a purpose of business to create a public
exigency; air, exercise, and recreation are important to the general
health and welfare; pleasure travel may be accommodated as well
as business travel; and highways may be condemned to places of
pleasing natural scenery."98
This phenomenon of the shift of the focus from production to
distribution is of course not confined to the province of eminent
domain. With regard to the police power, too, many restrictions
on the uses to which real property may be put, excess condemnation
and zoning are now sustained as valid exercises of the police power
which a few years ago in most jurisdictions were held unconstituBOA typical example of this period is, e.g., Davies v. State of Ohio ex rel.
Boyles, (1904) 75 Ohio 114, 78 N. E. 955. An Act entitled "An Act to
Provide Relief for Worthy Blind" (97 Ohio Laws, ch. 392) provided that
all male blind persons over 21 years, and all female blind persons over
eighteen years, who have no property or means with which to support
themselves, shall be entitled to and receive not more than $25 per capita
quarterly from the county treasury. The court held this act unconstitutional,
because "the public purpose, to warrant the exercise of the power of taxation, must be one which appeals to all the people, and is not in any sense
partisan." The further agreement of the court that relief of the blind may
lead straight to communism, fully anticipates the argument against the
federal government in United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville. The Ohio court argued as follows: "If a bounty may be conferred
upon individuals of one class, then it may be upon individuals of another
class, and, if upon two, then upon all. And, if upon those who have
physical infirmities, then why not upon other classes who for various
reasons may be unable to support themselves? And, if these things may
be done,
why may not all property be distributed by the state ?"
Q'7Pittsburgh v. Scott. (1845) 1 Pa. St. 309.
s'1Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, (1923) 35 Cal. App. 809, 170 Pac. 685.
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tional as invading legally protected property rights. In the field
of the "business affected with a public interest" the extension of
state control is marked from Munn v. Illhwis,99 decided in 1877,
to its present climax in Nebbia v. State of New York, 00 decided
in 1934. Still more marked is this shift of focus in economic and
judicial thinking in the development of labor decisions from
Lochner v. New York, 1 1 decided in 1905, to West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish,10 decided in 1937. The constitutionality of the Social
Security Act marks another important step in that direction. Public
housing is to be understood as a part of our contemporary movement to turn the efforts of the federal and of the state governments
to the problem of distribution, supplementing, not replacing, the
problem of production. The movement is already rich in achievement although young in age, and as far as the field of public housing is concerned, the courts have adapted their ideas to the changing
social and ideal pattern of our time, and have upheld the constitutionality of employing all three sovereign powers of the states,
the police power, taxing power, and the power of eminent domain.
England, the mother country of the common law, has experienced little if any difficulty of a legal character in carrying out
her housing programs since the World War. Obviously the
"purpose of the Housing Acts is to interfere with common law
rights,"'1 3 but this interference was never considered as fundamentally subversive of British legal and political institutions.
Already in 1918 we read in the "First Report of the Committee
Dealing with the Law and Practice Relating to the Acquisition and
Valuation of Land for Public Purpose" the recommendation of
the Committee that
"Any Public Department or Local Authority, on whom Parliament has imposed a duty or conferred a power, the due performance or exercise of which involves the acquisition of land,
should be able to acquire land compulsorily by some simple and
expeditious procedure.... Whenever the Public Interest requires
-the expropriation of particular land, there should be a simple
purpose, just compensation being
form of procedure to effect 1the
0 4

made to the owner affected."'
99(1877) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77
100(1934) 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R.
1469. Cf. Brown, The Function of Courts and Commissions in Public
Utility Rate Regulation, (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 141.
101(1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937.
102(1937) 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703.
'O'Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of EngLegislation, (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 437.
lish Housing
04
Ministry of Reconstruction, Cd. 8998 (1918) 13.
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The law of England to-day provides that owners of land may be
required by the Legislature to surrender "for purposes of public
utility"15 some or all of the rights they possess over their land.
The Public Health Act, 1875, section 175 gave power to certain
authorities to acquire land compulsorily for the following purposes:
sewerage and drainage; water supply; hospitals and mortuaries;
highways and streets; public pleasure grounds; markets and
slaughter-houses. The Housing Act, 1925, section 63, provides
that land for the purpose of erecting improved dwellings may be
condemned by local authorities in the same manner as though
it were one of the purposes enumerated in the Public Health Act
of 1875. The latest stage of English housing legislation is the
Housing Act 1936,10' which consolidates a number of former acts
and concentrates its program on slum-clearance and redevelopment
areas. A "clearance area" is defined as an area to be cleared of all
buildings either by the owner of the buildings under a clearance
order, or by a local authority after purchasing the land. The
procedure is the following: Where a local authority is satisfied
as respects any area in its district that the houses are unfit for
habitation or dangerous or injurious to the health of the inhabitants
of the area, and that the most satisfactory method of dealing with
the conditions in that area is the demolition of all the buildings in
it, the local authority defines the area and passes a resolution
declaring it a clearance area. The local authority may purchase
land compulsorily in the clearance area. Adjoining land may be
included in the compulsory purchase order. The owner of the
property can appeal against the order to the minister of health. The
minister of health can order an inquiry, and give a decision against
the local authority, but in practice this has happened very rarely
so far.
A "redevelopment area" is defined as an area containing fifty
or more working-class houses where at least one-third of the
working-class houses are overcrowded, or unfit for human habitation. Here, too, the same condemnation procedure obtains. An
aggrieved property owner who desires to question the validity of a
compulsory purchase order on the ground that it is not within
the statutory power or that any statutory requirement has not
been complied with. may, within six weeks after the publication of
the notice of confirmation make an application to the High Court.
It is important that this application can be made on the ground
1056 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed. 1932) 5.

11126 Geo. 5 & I Edw. 8, ch. 51.
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that there was no evidence at all adduced at the inquiry to support
the order, but not on the ground that such evidence was insufficient.1 1 7 Since, as Mr. Morrison stated before the United
States Senate, voluntary agreements with the owners are "very
rare,"10 this speedy and simple condemnation procedure saves
much litigation, cost and delay of construction. The important
point is that the English law interprets "public use" as public
interest or public benefit, and not as "use by the public" as American courts have done for a long time, especially under the influence
of the extension of due process on substantive matters. Thus, one
of the major legal issues of American governmental housing is
alien to the body of the English law; the same is true of all the
other democratic countries in Europe or overseas where housing
has been recognized as a public utility like water, light on the
streets, education, etc., to which every citizen has a right. 10 9 In
this country, too, this governmental activity of a responsible
democracy will find its legitimate place in the body of deeply
rooted legal ideas and institutions.
107The leading English housing case is Local Government Board v.

Arlidge, [1915] A. C. 120, 84 L. J.K. B. 72, 111 L. T. 905, 79 J.P. 97, 12
L. G. R. 1109, 30 T. L. R. 672.
losSenate Hearing April 15, 1937, S. 1685, at 130.
lOoFor the legal and constitutional issues involved in public housing
cf. Jennings' essay, Courts and Administrative Law-the Experience of
English Housing Legislation, (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 426. The more general issue of public use in eminent domain is discussed in Burckhardt,
Kommentar der Schweizerischen Bundesverfassung (1931) 159, for Switzerland; Hariou, Droit Coristitutionnel (1923) 81, and Giraud, Le jury de
l'Expropriation pour Cause d'UtilitE Publique (1932) for France; Kruse,
Eigentumsrecht (1931) 251, for the Scandinavian countries.

